HISTORY
OF THE
MILITARY
POLICE

      
Photos Courtesy Of MP Museum

 

The American Revolution through the Mexican War

Although soldiers have been delegated to perform police type duties in the military since the beginning of armies, the seed that germinated into the birth of the modern Military Police Corps in 1941 can be traced back to the American Revolutionary War.  At the beginning of the American Revolution, the Continental Army adopted, with little change the forms, titles and administrative procedures of the British Army including those pertaining to military police.  A resolution of Congress on 27 May 1778 established a “Provost” in the Continental Army to consist of the following:  a captain, four lieutenants, one clerk, a quartermaster sergeant, two trumpeters, two sergeants, five corporals, forty-three provosts, and four executioners.  This force was to be mounted and accoutered as light dragoons; its mission was to apprehend deserters, rioters, and stragglers.  In battle, it would be posted in the rear to secure fugitives.  The unit, soon styled the “troops of Marechausee” after the French term for their provost troops, was organized on 1 June 1778 at Valley Forge, Pennsylvania.  Of the original fifty-five men in the Marechausee Corps, one was a captain and two were lieutenants.  Forty-three of these men had been recruited in Pennsylvania and they were mostly of German heritage

During the Revolutionary War, the Marechaussee Corps was utilized in a variety of missions.  In 1779, Captain Bartholomew Von Heer, Provost Marshal of the Marechaussee Corps, was instructed to organize a patrol to obtain intelligence of the enemy’s movement on the south side of the Raritan toward Amboy, New Jersey.  In November 1780, Washington directed the Corps to join Colonel Stephen Moylan and proceed to the Hackensack.  They were to secure all its crossings to prevent persons from carrying intelligence to the enemy. During the battle of Springfield a shortage of cavalry led Washington to employ the Marechaussee Corps in a combat role in the vicinity of Springfield, New Jersey.  At the battle of Yorktown in 1781, the Marechaussee Corps provided security for Washington’s headquarters which was near Dobbs Ferry, Virginia.  In September 1782, the Provost Corps was temporarily attached to General Washington’s Life Guard.  The Corps was disbanded on 4 November 1783 at Rock Hill, New Jersey.  A small detachment was retained as part of Washington’s Life Guard to provide security at Army Headquarters.  It escorted the Commander back to his home at Mount Vernon.

The apprehension, detention, security and movement of prisoners of war was another minor mission of the Provost Corps during the American Revolution.  Prisoners were exchanged for Continental Army soldiers who had been captured by the British.  The Commissary General of the Army was responsible for all prisoners and all prisoner exchanges.  Due to the minimal resources of the Continental Army, many prisoners were returned to the British after promising never to resume fighting in the current conflict.  Other prisoners, primarily the Hessians, German mercenaries employed by the British, were loaned to farmers, blacksmiths and other businessmen in return for providing them with room and board.  After the war, the Commissary General of the Army posted advertisements in the local newspapers requesting the return of all prisoners of war so they could be transported to England.  Still, many remained as the indentured servants of merchants in Pennsylvania and Virginia.

While the Marechaussee Corps was the major military police-type unit during the American Revolution, other enforcement units also were organized.  In 1777, the Continental Army created a specialized unit called the Corps of Invalids; and in 1779, another police-type unit was organized by the state of Virginia for prisoner of war duties.

During the War of 1812 and the Mexican War, 1845-1848, the lack of an organized Military Police Corps reflected the general ill-preparedness of the total Armed Forces of the United States to conduct military operations.  Many politicians in Congress were wary of a strong military and did little to provide for an adequate peacetime Army or Navy.  In war commanders had to marshal citizen militia to maintain a sufficient force.  Once a battle ended and the Army relocated. Few of the militia troops remained with it.  Facing serious shortages of troops and equipment, commanders focused their resources on infantry and artillery tactics instead of police matters.  Article 58 of the Army’s General Regulations issued in 1820 did outline the duties of military police and recommended that commanding officers select personnel of superior physical ability and intelligence to fulfill them.  However, the article did not require that the men assigned to be military police receive any specific training and in practice those commanders who established such a force normally assigned the duty on a temporary roster basis.

Nevertheless, in the Mexican War, the duties performed by modern military police were not totally ignored.  When General Winfield Scott took his army into Central Mexico, he proclaimed a code of martial law in the occupied areas and appointed military governors to enforce it.  In Mexico City he also organized four hundred picket soldiers as a police force to supplement the native establishment.  Throughout the Mexican War, units were detailed to perform provost-type duties.  For example, after American Forces captured Santa Fe, New Mexico, the Second Missouri Mounted was detailed to keep the peace in that city.  Likewise, in April 1846, General Zachary Taylor assigned the Second Dragoons to provide small patrols in and around Fort Brown, Texas, to prevent the infiltration of Mexican soldiers into the area.  After Mexico City was captured, the central valley of Mexico was in complete discord.  Dragoons were used to patrol the area, break up fighting, and impose military law.  The Army also utilized a small section of its various units to collect stragglers on long marches, to enforce regulations, and to ensure that orders for discipline were enforced.

The Civil War through the Spanish/American War

During the Civil War, national necessity paved the way for the organization of provost units and provost marshals within the Federal Army. The initial influx of northern soldiers into the city of Washington following the bombardment of Fort Sumter produced pandemonium.  With local authorities lacking any effective means of maintaining discipline, chaos became the order of the day.  As the northern troops moved out of Washington and into the South, so did the lawlessness. Northern soldiers considered southern property fair game for the taking.  Concerned about this problem of disorderly plundering, General Irvin McDowell, the Union Army’s first filed commander, directed the commander of each regiment to select a commissioned officer as the regimental provost marshal.  Each provost marshal, in turn, was assigned ten enlisted men, who would serve as a permanent police force with the sole duty of protecting civilian property from the marching soldiers.  Thus began the gradual extension of the jurisdiction of the provost marshal system from responsibility for maintaining law and order within the military to also include protection for and control of the civilian population.   

The Battle of Bull Run and the resulting retreat to Washington followed on the heels of the creation of this newly appointed police force.  While the disorderly troops from the defeated Union Army once again created pandemonium in the city, Major General George B. McClellan arrived to take command of the Army of the Potomac.  Appointed to this post on 26 July 1861, McClellan was charged with the immediate safety of the capital and the government.  To insure that law and order were maintained within Washington, he assigned a squad of regular cavalry and a battery of regular artillery to serve as the provost guard for the city.  On 30 July 1861, Colonel Andrew Porter, 16th United States Infantry, was appointed as temporary Provost Marshal of Washington with all regular troops in the area being delegated as Provost Guards. Using approximately 1000 infantry, a battery of artillery, and a squadron of cavalry, Colonel Porter implemented a system of traffic control which required all officers and men to carry passes.  Mounted and foot patrols were also used to enforce a 9:00 PM Curfew on all soldiers.  Witnessing the subsequent chaos, a British journalist noted “the change which had taken place in the streets . . .  No drunken rabblement or armed men, no begging soldiers, instead of these were patrols in the streets, guards at the corners, and a rigid system of passes”.  As the riotous atmosphere of the city subsided, another problem surfaced.  A burdensome flow of military personnel and civilians began moving into and out of the city, thereby rendering it difficult to control subversive elements within the area.  To alleviate this problem, McClellan issued a new order which placed greater restrictions on the issuance of passes and extended restrictions to the civilian as well as the military population.

Having restored order to the city of Washington, Colonel Porter was appointed Provost Marshal General of the Army of the Potomac.  The Second United States Cavalry and a battalion of the 8th and 17th United States Infantry became the provost guard under his command.  After announcing Porter’s appointment, General McClellan instructed his division commanders to organize a provost guard and to appoint an officer as the provost marshal for each division. Although Porter coordinated the operations of the division provost marshals, the authority delegated to them was determined by their division commander.  The duties performed by the provost guards included the suppression of marauding and looting of private property, the prevention of straggling, the preservation of order, the suppression of gambling houses and other establishments disruptive to troop discipline, and the supervision of hotels, saloons and places of amusement. The provost marshals were also responsible for the following:  making searches, seizures and arrests; assuming charge of enemy deserters and prisoners of war; issuing passes to citizens; and hearing civilian complaints against the military.  In the field, McClellan expanded his order for divisional provost marshals and guards to include corps and Army units as well.  Although other Union armies also had provosts, they were organized on a more informal basis than those of the Army of the Potomac.

While serving in the field, General McClellan employed the provost marshals and guards to restore order among a mutinous regiment.  With Special Order #27, McClellan directed that the 79th Regiment of New York Volunteers return to duty.  Furthermore, he directed that the mutiny’s ring leaders be punished and that the regimental colors be removed.  Instructed to fire on the troops if necessary, Colonel Porter employed a battery of artillery, two companies of cavalry, and several infantry companies to squelch this uprising.  He placed its ring leaders in irons and had the remainder of the unit marched to the front in Virginia.

After the Battle of Antietam, General Porter was relieved of his duties due to sickness.  Brigadier General Marsena Randolph Patrick then assumed the post of Provost Marshal of the Army of the Potomac.  In addition to his military police duties, he also became the chief of a newly created bureau of military information.  The provost marshals in the field henceforth procured, processed and disseminated intelligence information throughout the army.  The bureau was responsible for providing the Army of the Potomac with the size, disposition and composition of Confederate forces.

Along with his military police and intelligence duties, General Patrick also was involved in procurement for the Army of the Potomac.  During the war hundreds of merchants followed the Army from camp to camp trying to sell tobacco, food, clothes, and trinkets to the soldiers.  The Army also made large scale purchases of vegetables, meats and horses from local suppliers.  It was Patrick’s job to review all purchases and merchants to insure that top quality products were obtained for the lowest prices.  If a merchant was discovered cheating the troops, his seller’s pass was withdrawn.  Thus, employing an intricate system of passes which changed with each new commander and new area, undesirable merchants, camp followers, and certain newspaper reporters were denied access to the main troop area. 

The need for a well trained and adequate military police force was evident in December, 1862, during the maneuvering around Fredericksburg, Virginia.  While Confederate troops dug into defensive positions south of the town, the Union troops encamped north of it.  The local citizens were allotted forty eight hours to relocate before the start of the battle.  After the town was evacuated, the Union forces occupied it and waited for three days before advancing because their supplies and ammunition had been stolen from a depot outside of Washington.  The northern commanders could not delay.  Union troops poured into the town, pilfering goods and burning public buildings.  To maintain order, General Patrick had only two cavalry units and four infantry companies.  Although many were arrested, the town was still plundered by thousands of men before the Union forces began to march against the Southern defensive lines.  Taking advantage of the Union delay, Confederate troops further fortified their position and successfully repelled the Northern advance.  During the Union retreat, Patrick finally cleared Fredericksburg of Union troops, but the looting left a permanent stain on his military career.

On June 28, 1863, General George G. Mead assumed command of the Army of the Potomac and immediately issued orders which began the Gettysburg campaign.  Failing to follow normal march procedures, General Meade did not provide Patrick with the necessary cavalry squadrons to control stragglers during the advance.  This oversight resulted in troops being spread throughout the town along the route with many components of the Union Army never reaching Pennsylvania.  General Patrick had to commandeer a force and back track among chaos and confusion to corral all the drunks and stragglers who had abandoned the march.  From this ordeal, Meade learned a valuable and time-consuming lesson in the use of designated provost troops.  During the three days of fighting at Gettysburg, the Southern forces delivered the heaviest artillery barrage of the entire war.  As Union veterans began breaking rank during it, General Patrick organized two provost lines to contain all the deserters and stragglers.  Some of the stragglers, unable to reunite with their units, were used to escort two thousand Confederate prisoners to rear-area prison camps. 

At the Battle of Gettysburg, General Patrick developed detailed plans for movement of prisoners of war.  He secured rail transportation from the battlefield to hospitals and prison camps in nearby towns.  After the three days struggle ended, Patrick contracted local citizens to bury the dead and secure their personal belongings for the next of kin.  Attempts were also made by Patrick’s men to check the swarm of citizens and soldiers plundering the battlefield, but the vast numbers of dead strewn across it overwhelmed his small force.

Towards the end of the war, Union troops captured thousands of Confederate prisoners and marched them to rear areas under light guard provided by the capturing unit.  The Army’s permanent prison facilities at Fort Monroe and Alexandria lacked adequate food and shelter to house them.  Therefore, General Patrick immediately exchanged or released prisoners after major conflicts.  The only alternative to that policy was to allow them to face starvation and deprivation while awaiting uncertain transportation to northern prison camps.  Since no standards for processing prisoners were developed during the war, they had to rely solely on the logic, compassion, and humanitarianism of the capturing commander or local provost marshal for their welfare.  In the North and South, prisoner of war camps suffered from inadequate planning, untrained personnel, and insufficient resources.

As the Union Armies advanced into Southern territory, Confederate civil government began to crumble.  In an attempt to improvise a system of government in these areas, the Army expanded the functions of the provost marshals from policing the military to policing the occupied districts; in effect governing them.  The provost marshals decided which Southern civilians should be taken into custody and which should remain free to pursue their daily tasks.  They were also responsible for distributing food, clothing and other goods during periods of scarcity.  This system was used everywhere except in Sherman’s military division which demonstrated more tolerance for local officials after the cessation of hostilities.  The provost marshals developed a system of determining the allegiance of Southerners and the degree of freedom which would be allowed to them.  In occupied territory there was a provost marshal commanding each district with an assistant provost in command of each sub-district.  They were also responsible for the apprehension o deserters and the prevention of blockade running along the seacoast and inland waterways.  On 13 March 1865, General Patrick was appointed provost marshal of all armies operating against Richmond.  When the city fell, Patrick took over the functions of its government.  All new comers in the area were required to take oath of allegiance.  A provost tax of one percent was imposed on all imports and exports in the district, and all citizens over eighteen were required to register at the Provost headquarters.  For a time after the war ended, military provost marshals governed Confederate states, but they were soon challenged by groups demanding the appointment of local officials.  In 1865, General Ulysses S. Grant authorized the transfer of mot of the functions of the government from the provost marshals to the Freedmen’s Bureau. 

Along with providing discipline and order among the troops in the field and governing occupied areas of the South, the provost marshal system was also responsible for the procurement of manpower through the draft.  On 3 March 1863, Congress established the Office of Provost Marshal General of the United States with the rank of Colonel.  A provost marshal was also assigned to each congressional district, with the rank of captain. In compliance with General Order # 67, Colonel James B. Fry was appointed Provost Marshal General of the United States and held this position for the duration of the conflict.  Fry was charged with overseeing the administration and enforcement of military recruitment and conscription.  His responsibilities encompassed combating desertion, setting state quotas, distribution of bounties, and dealing with other problems associated with conscription.  He also helped quell draft riots such as those which occurred in Boston and New York.  With the appointment of Colonel Fry, responsibility for the draft, which had been largely a state function, passed to the Federal Government.  As Provost Marshal General, Fry was confronted with the monumental task of recruiting 400,000 men just to bring existing regiments up to necessary strength.

Desertion was equally challenging for the Provost Marshal General, as many men chose to cross the Missouri River and face the Indians rather than fight their Southern cousins.  From 1 October 1863 to 1 October 1864, the provost marshals arrested 39, 392 deserters and stragglers.  During the war, approximately 200,000men deserted from the Federal Army.  The Provost Marshal’s Bureau arrested and returned about 76,562 of those men between March 1863 and the end of the war.

The National Conscription Act contained many loopholes which promoted dishonesty and corruption.  Often an individual would join a unit in one state, collect his bounty, desert as soon as practical, and rejoin the Army in a different state to collect another bounty.  Since the states organized their own regiments, these bounty jumpers were hard to detect and apprehend.  This problem led to the creation of a squad of Federal detectives organized by Colonel Lafayette C. Baker of the War Department.  These detectives, who became the nucleus of The United States Secret Service, curbed bounty jumpers, service brokers and deserters.  In some cases, they also worked effectively with local provost marshals to halt theft of government supplies and equipment.

As a result of disparity in the impact of the conscription program upon men of opposite socioeconomic status, many working-class citizens, especially in large Northern cities, revolted and caused massive destruction during anti-draft riots.  While the war raged in Gettysburg, tempers flared in New York City.  The city’s poor who could not buy or bribe their way out of the draft, took to the streets in revolt.  What began as a few hundred protesters speaking out against the war, ended with a mob of thousands burning every government building in the city?  The 8th Indiana Regiment had to be brought from Gettysburg by Colonel Fry to quell the riot.  This was the worst but not the only anti-war riot during the Civil War.  It is interesting to note that no unit of provost marshals or troops serving as field military police were ever detailed to stop any anti-draft demonstrations during this period.

Colonel Fry had two authorized sources of manpower to perform military police functions; details supplied by the commander of military departments and the Invalid Corps.  Created on 28 April 1863 by General Order #105, the latter was composed of officers and enlisted men who were no longer fit for frontline service but had enlisted for further duty or been transferred from field units.  This Corps consisted of 24 regiments and 106 separate companies.  In each of the full regiments, a first battalion of six companies was utilized for guard duty and as an emergency reserve.  Armed with smoothbore muskets instead of rifles, they served provost guards in large cities and towns, escorts for prisoners of war, security guards for railroads, and performed all types of garrison duty.  The second battalion, consisting of four companies, contained men who were more restricted by reason of health.  In emergency situations, the Invalid Corps was called upon to assist in the field.  In 1864, for example, the 9th Regiment was detailed to field duty during Early’s Raid near Washington.  On July 2, 1864, Major General Jubal Early invaded Maryland and struck towards Washington, brushing aside General Lew Wallace’s forces on the Monocacy River.  Until the arrival of the Union Army’s VI and XIX Corps from Richmond, the defense of the Capital was left in the hands of the home guards.  During its existence, about sixty thousand men served in the Corps.  The Invalid Corps changed its name to the Veterans Reserve Corps in 1864, and remained an organization of the United States Army until the end of the war. 

In the Federal Army the duties of the military police were performed by the Army provost marshals and their guards consisting of men detailed from the line units until the Provost Marshal Department was created in March 1863.  Originating to meet the need for control of undisciplined troops in the cities and the field, the role of the military police gradually expanded to include the Conscription Program and control of government in the occupied Southern states.  The very nature of the war placed the provost marshal system in the unique position of serving as a bridge of stability during the transition from war to peace in the defeated South. By 1866, the Veterans Reserve Corps had been disbanded, the Office of the Provost Marshal General abolished, and military police work once again was viewed as a temporary duty.

With the expansion of the Army due to the Spanish American War in 1898, the military police command function became greater than at any time during the preceding thirty years.  A major development was the appointment of Brigadier General Arthur MacArthur as Military Governor and Provost Marshal General of the walled city of Manila in the Philippines.  He was ordered to relieve the civil governor and “to take possession of the office, clerks, and machinery of that office.” Subsequently, a Provost Guard Brigade composed of troops drawn from the Cavalry, Infantry, and Artillery units was established to maintain martial law in the city of Manila.  Brigadier General Harry H. Bandholtz became chief of the Police Brigade. The reports of General MacArthur from Manila to the War Department referred to the men performing police and patrol duties as military police.  At the same time, the report from the Chief of police enumerated the number of arrests made for various offenses by “military and native police.”  For the first time, men performing police duties were referred to specifically as military police.

       
World War I

Following the entry of the United States into World War I, Major General Enoch H. Crowder was appointed Provost Marshal General of the Army.  His mission was to develop and enforce a Selective Service Act.  General Crowder, also the Staff Judge Advocate General, studied Fry’s experience during the Civil War in order to avoid making the same mistakes.  In 1917 the nation’s first successful Selective Service System was established, based on medical classification and a lottery system which satisfied America’s sense of fair play.  It involved prominent citizens picking at random a section of the population to report for military duty.  The fairness of the system inhibited the development of major opposition to the draft, and the United States did not see a repetition of the anti-draft riots it had experienced during the Civil War.

As troops of the American Expeditionary Forces began to arrive in France, the necessity for military police became apparent.  A provost marshal was appointed to General Pershing’s staff as advisor on provost marshal and military police matters.  On 20 September 1918, Brigadier General Harry Hill Bandholtz became Provost Marshal General of the American Expeditionary Force.  After much study and many recommendations, the establishment of a Military Police Corps, for the duration of the emergency, was finally approved by the War Department one month before the signing of the Armistice.  During the intervening time, military police duties had been performed by all types of units, hastily activated without any special su0ervision or technical training.  Personnel performing these duties were selected on a basis of availability and physical fitness with little regard for mental qualification or general suitability.  Upon establishment of the Military Police Corps, measures were taken immediately to remedy the serious defects:  unsuitability of personnel, lack of training, and absence of approved doctrine.

Drawing on his previous experience with the Provost Brigade in Manila, General Bandholtz organized the military police into a professional corps.  Government Orders #180, #200, and #217 fixed the duties and responsibilities so that the Provost Marshal became the true commander of the new Corps. The military Police developed their own chain of command, leaving the Service of Supply troops responsible for their own depots.  The Military Police Service School, the first step in developing a professional corps, started classes at the Caserne Changarnier in Autun, France.  Finding a suitable staff and faculty proved difficult.  Since this was the first school of its kind in the United States Army, the British sent one of their officers to serve as its chief instructor.  Service of Supply and Divisional Military Police Companies were screened for school candidates and possible faculty members.  Twenty-one enlisted men were selected for the first class.  After their graduation, they became the first faculty members of the school.  The school graduated a class of officers and enlisted men every two weeks.  During its brief history, 3,557 enlisted students and 465 officers graduated.  Although another 210 soldiers attended the school, they were transferred to other branches as unsuitable police candidates.

Circulation control was the first mission assigned to the military police by Government Order #23, issued in August 1917.  The object of circulation control was to prevent unauthorized individuals from entering the zones of operations which had been devised by the French.  Military Police checked all personnel traveling in leave areas, major cities, and at examining points in the rear Army areas.  Government Order #63, specified the types of passes, authority for issue, control procedures, and enforcement techniques.  In July 1918 it became apparent that the existing detachments of one officer and one enlisted man could not check and maintain circulation control in major cities.  Two sections were organized to handle the increasing workload:  a permit section and an absent without leave apprehension section.  The permit section issued passes, maintained all circulation papers, informed the commander on all orders involving circulation control, and was responsible for area and zone maps.  The absent without leave section had one officer and five clerks to maintain records of all absentees and deserters as well as lost or stolen property of high value.

Organizing a Criminal Investigation Division proved difficult due to a lack of experienced personnel.  Its mission, defined in May 1918, was to establish a detective squad similar to that found in any city police department. Using people with civilian experience as detectives, inspectors, special agents, lawyers, or newspaper reporters, area provost marshals selected and trained all investigative personnel.  Initially, due to the vast geographical location of operatives, it was impossible to train or supervise their investigative efforts.  During the reorganization of the Military Police Corps in 1918, the Criminal Investigation Section was also changed.  Eight companies with five officers and one hundred enlisted men in each were formed, resulting in stronger central control.  Operatives, or agents, were authorized to wear civilian clothes and spend public money to procure information or evidence.  They were furnished special passes which allowed them access to any area or activity.  From 12 December 1918 to 12 April 1919, The Criminal Investigation Division handled 4,500 cases, of which only 500 were forwarded to the Rents, Requisition, and Claims Service for resolution.  Prior to trials or shipment to the United States seven area photography sections handled fingerprints, photographs, and records of all criminals.  During investigations of black-market activities, various mobsters were apprehended that had previously escaped New York, Chicago, or Washington Police Departments.  In addition to black-market activities, the CID investigated fraudulent passes sold in troop areas; worthless check cashing operations in all major foreign cities, mail thefts and the theft of retail sales or government supplies and equipment.  Probably the CID’s most spectacular arrest occurred in January 1919.  Nine soldiers, absent without leave in Paris, were terrorizing citizens with robberies, rapes, and assaults.  Army criminal investigators finally located their headquarters.  After a furious shoot out with the criminals, the investigators recovered large sums of currency, numerous automatic weapons, and officer uniforms from several armies, army equipment, and a Red Cross ambulance filled with items recently stolen from a railroad baggage room.  The gang members subsequently confessed to thirty-two felonious crimes.  As a result of these incidents, the investigations division gained the respect and trust of the allied police organizations.

During World War I, massive numbers of prisoners of war presented a new problem for the United States Army.  In previous wars, prisoners had been kept for exchange purposes only, and little attention had been paid to temporary field confinement.  In January 1918, a study of French and English confinement methods was initiated.  Little was accomplished until June 1918, when the first United States troops in combat captured 255 Germans at Cantigny.  By prior agreement with the French Army, the Americans would process and confine all prisoners captured by United States forces.  Expedient field measures were immediately adopted.  The first compounds were barbed wire enclosures with tent which included limited kitchen facilities, poor sanitation facilities, and first aid stations manned by captured German medics.  Prisoners also faced inadequate clothing, bedding, and food supplies.  Even prisoner of war compounds were organized, mainly using old stockades and French castles.  During the ten month period in which American troops processed prisoners of war, Escort Guard Companies handled 48,280 prisoners.

Government Order #31, dated 30 May 1918, stated that the G-1 was responsible for disposition of all prisoners of war, while the Provost Marshal General was responsible for their charge and custody.  To complete this awesome task, the establishment of Escort Guard Companies was necessary.  These companies were responsible for transporting all prisoners from the division cages to the central prisoners of war enclosure at St. Pierre de Corps.  Officers and guards for the division cages were provided by the division commander as required.  Personnel for the Escort Guard Companies were Class C soldiers, unfit for combat due to physical or emotional disabilities.  The officers were detailed from the Service of Supply Companies for temporary duty in prisoner compounds.  Without trained men or an organized plan, the success of the entire system depended upon the initiative and logic of the assigned personnel.  Fortunately, the Germans were well disciplined soldiers, easily controlled by their own non-commissioned officers, and willing to accept American living and working conditions.  The total operation relied on luck and the ingenuity of the American soldiers.  Escort Guard Companies normally consisted of three officers and one hundred enlisted men.  However, many enlisted personnel were traveling between division cages and area stockades, leaving few men actually guarding the prisoners.  To facilitate order and discipline the prisoners were organized into prisoner of war labor companies consisting of four hundred laborers and a fifty-man overhead contingent (clerks, cooks, hospital orderlies, supply sergeants, tailors, shoemakers, and interpreters).  Every effort was made to collect the same type of laborers n each company.  Each prisoner worked nine hours a day, six days a week.

Evaluation and documentation of military police functions in the theater of operations were imperative to the future survival of the corps.  To accomplish this task, General Bandholtz ordered all division commanders to submit a report concerning military police activities in their area, giving the strengths and weaknesses of their assigned military police company.  Despite the obvious weakness resulting from a lack of formal training and a shortage of military police personnel, most commanders were unanimous in their praise of the military police.  Especially noteworthy were the repeated comments on their determination, devotion to duty and ingenuity in accomplishing their mission.  Acts of individual heroism abounded among them, and numerous citations were awarded to military policemen.

The 1st Division Military Police operated in the Argonne Woods controlling access to the front.  During the German advance in that area in 1918 many crossroads and towns were heavily bombarded by their artillery, but the military police swiftly directed three divisions into the battle with no casualties.  Often the enemy artillery was fired at regular intervals, allowing military police to move the majority of truck traffic through towns during periods of calm and to halt traffic before heavy shelling resumed.

Prior to the Aisne-Marne offensive in July, 1918, units speeding to the front created a huge traffic snarl.  The situation worsened as heavy rains halted trucks in mud and mire. The traffic problem was intensified by failing to provide the 2nd Division Military Police Company with an early warning of the advance, a lack of reconnaissance, and the absence of a specific order of march.  Upon the arrival of the 2nd Division Military Police, alternate routes were explored.  Military vehicles and artillery pieces which could not be moved were overturned to allow continuous traffic flow to the front. Empty trucks returning were halted and parked in safe areas away from the main road.  Infantry troops were commandeered by military police to aid in road repairs.  It took several hours of strenuous work just to clear the main road.  At crossroad traffic points military police went several days without sleep while keeping traffic moving swiftly along proper routes.

During the German offensive in July, 1918, the 3rd Division Military Police were busy controlling stragglers from the rapidly moving division.  The subsequent counter-offensive of the 3rd Division encountered heavy enemy artillery fire and gas attacks, causing many soldiers to stop advancing or to bolt towards the rear.  The military police held the line despite their own losses, twelve killed and thirteen wounded.  Other duties included processing and guarding prisoners of war, controlling traffic in order to speed supplies to the front and wounded to the rear, and assisting aid stations by escorting stragglers to the front lines. 

After action testimonials from twelve divisional commanders complimented the military police for their professionalism in controlling traffic, controlling stragglers (an increasingly difficult task during chemical attacks), handling prisoners, speeding wounded from the front aid stations to the rear, and enforcing laws and regulations which prohibited American troops from looting and plundering captured cities.  The 4th Division Commander was amazed that his military police company did not have any absentees even though its men went without sleep and proper food for days, due to personnel shortages and transportation problems.  Thus, the military police had successfully solved a myriad of unusual problems which had demanded quick thinking, stern control, and positive action.

As open conflict ended, the military police were utilized in dispersing prisoners of war and maintaining martial law in conquered Germany.  At the beginning of World War I, the Provost Marshal had been assigned eleven men for research and development.  As the duties of the Provost Marshal General expanded, manpower allocations were increased. One thousand, one hundred and sixty one officers and 30,466 enlisted men were serving as military policemen at the height of the war. These men were assigned throughout Europe in 146 different military police companies (8 criminal investigation, 50 divisional, and 88 general support sections in cities and towns.)

In April 1919, Brigadier General Bandholtz submitted a report to the War Department which enumerated the shortcoming of the Military Police Corps and the Provost Marshal General’s Department.  The remedy for the existing situation was, in his words, the: “Maintenance of a specially organized Military Police Corps, in our peacetime military establishment, with units that may be actively engaged in military police duties, particularly during maneuvers and field training, whose personnel shall be carefully selected and highly trained, having such Esprit de Corps and intelligent appreciation of their functions as will enable the individual military police to perform his often delicate duties with assurance and certainty, yet without offense or embarrassment.  Then in case of war we will have the nucleus to supply instructors for the needed expansion, and trained units to be the first troops to report at any training area.”

Although General Bandholtz’s proposed permanent Military Police Corps was rejected by Congress, progress was achieved through the National Defense Act of 1920.  This act provided for the organization of Army Reserve Military Police units and resulted in the first reserve military police officers being commissioned in 1921.  A directive outlining the organization and function of the Military Police Corps in the event of mobilization was issued in July of 1924.  Each division was ordered to appoint an acting Provost Marshal in case of activation.  However, these positions were either figureheads or additional duties for an officer already on the division’s staff.  The next significant event in the evolution of a permanent Military Police Corps occurred in 1937.  At that time, the War Department published Basic Field Manual IX, Military Police, providing for the organization of a Provost Marshal General Department.  The outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 brought about change in existing regulations, and a Military Police Corps was again projected in the event of a future national emergency.

     
World War II

The rapid buildup of the United States Army during World War II highlighted the need for an organized Military Police Corps.  Major General Allen W. Gullion, the Adjutant General of the Army, was appointed acting Provost Marshal of the Army on 31 July 1941.  He collected data concerning members of the Army currently to serve as military police.  Corps and divisions had assigned personnel from existing branches serving as military police, and the Department of the Army did not know the exact number of men habitually used in law enforcement duties.  Aside from the manpower organizational efforts, General Gullion also planned for the primary mission of military police:  control of enemy aliens and internment of foreigners residing in the United States.  A central operating authority higher than Corps level was necessary to meet that mission.

The Secretary of War responded with the establishment of a permanent Military Police Corps on 26 September 1941.  This date is the official birthday of the Military Police Corps.  It marks a turning point in the corps’ history from a transitory branch of the Army to a permanent combat service support element operating during war and peace.  The initial members of the Corps were chosen as a result of their current assignment as military police at Army installations.

Three battalions and four separate companies of military police were formed immediately from existing assets.  These units consisted of approximately 2,000 persons.  During the course of the conflict the Military Police grew to strength of over 200,000 enlisted and 9,250 officers.  Five different tables of organization, developed by the Infantry, were initially used by military police battalions.  After the addition of the Military Police Board in January 1942, nine new organizational tables were created along with major revisions to the other five. By February 1942, seventeen battalions had been activated under these tables.  The types of companies available for service by the end of the year were grouped according to major functions:  Zone of Interior Guards, Escort Guard, Post-Camp and Station, Prisoner of War and Processing, Aviation Military Police Organizations, and Criminal Investigation Detachments.

As a result of the massive influx of personnel, a Military Police Service School was established at the Arlington Cantonment in Virginia.  The school was relocated several times prior to the end of the decade.  It was the beginning of the creation of a highly professional Military Police Corps.  Many of the subjects taught were similar t those which had been taught at the World War I school at Autun, France.  However, the initial emphasis of the World War II Corps was on internal security and intelligence functions, altering the focus of the school.  As in the previous war, the Military Police
Corps expanded rapidly.  By the end of 1945, about 150 battalions and 900 other military police units had been activated.

The United States fought the war on two widely separated fronts.  One product of the divergence between them was that the operation of the military police in the two Theater Armies differed dramatically.  In the Pacific, each military police unit was assigned a specific function, resulting in an overlapping geographic area of operation among several units.  This created confusion among the military police, as well as the troops they served.  For example, when a soldier approached a military policeman about a traffic incident, the military policeman might respond that he only handled stragglers.  As a result, many soldiers thought the military police were attempting to shirk their responsibilities by diverting complaints to other units.  Another problem in the Pacific Theatre was the use of military police assets as individual reinforcements for infantry units.  This practice resulted in band members, transportation personnel, and communications personnel being utilized in the security of ports, depots, railroads, and other vital rear area installations.  Since General Douglas A. MacArthur and his staff approved of this practice, there was little the local provost marshals could accomplish against it.  Often huge supply losses resulted from a lack of security at ports, but no attempt was made to correct the situation.  Conversely, military police units in the European Theatre of Operations had an excellent rapport with the troops they served, were tightly controlled and well-organized.  Units were assigned total military police responsibilities within a specific geographic area.  Although military policemen had to obtain a wide variety of knowledge to perform their mission, this system reinforced the soldier’s concept of each military policeman being capable of performing all law enforcement functions.

The primary missions of the Provost Marshal General’s Department during the first years of the war were as follows:  protection of war production in the United States, internment of prisoners of war, and establishment of an active civil defense plan.  Industrialists demanded that the Federal government provide security against theft, sabotage, and destruction of military equipment that they were producing.  To remedy the situation, an “Auxiliary Military Police” was created combining active duty military police with civilian guard services at all key industrial complexes.  The active duty units involved were commonly known as Zone of Interior Guard Companies.  In addition to guarding factories, the military police serving in the United States had to process and secure prisoners of war.  Following the North African campaign, numerous German soldiers were captured and shipped to the United States for confinement.  Persons later captured in Europe were also sent to the United States. By 1945 approximately 750,000 German prisoners were detained in the United States in over six hundred compounds located throughout the country.  The prisoners were employed in meatpacking plants, lumber mills, mines, on the southern farms, in public works projects, and in transportation services.  The Provost Marshal General was responsible for their care, security and safety.  After the war ended, this responsibility expanded to include reorientation and repatriation programs.

In European Theatre Operations, military police duties were similar to those performed in World War I.  Additional authority granted to the military police provided for greater control of refugees, civilians, absentees, stragglers, and all activities within the rear area. Staff Provost Marshals recommended changes in the rear boundaries of corps and became the chief consultants in security planning for rear areas.  Their excellent knowledge of rear area operations led to the appointment of a Provost Marshal/Rear Area Commander on 21 November 1944. Once assigned specific terrain, the provost marshal designated defensive measures against small-scale enemy attacks from air or ground guerrilla forces.  The rear area defensive mission also included holding larger attacking elements in check until the arrival of tactical troops.  Military police likewise ere used to halt bulges or breakthrough attacks by enemy frontline troops.  Other missions included:  traffic control; collection, custody, and evacuation of prisoners of war; criminal investigations; enforcement of regulations and special orders of the commander; apprehension of deserters; reassignment or relocation of stragglers; cooperation with local civilian police on curfews; blackouts; police protection, anti-sabotage , and patrolling captured towns; control of civilians and civilian employees; supervision of installations for refugees and the feeding of non-combatants until G5 could assume that duty; security of all Army headquarters; control of the light line and straggler line; enforcement of all “Off Limits” areas in leave cities; informing G2 and G4 on the status of roads, bridges, and enemy activity; and establishing alternate road network subsections to speed divisions laterally across the frontlines.

During beachhead operations, military police came in fighting with the airborne and infantry divisions.  When the First, Fourth, and Twenty-ninth Division hit the Omaha and Utah beaches on June 6, 1944, detachments from the 783rd Military Police Battalion joined them in starting the beginning of the decline of the Nazi fortress in Europe.  During the confusion and disorder of the first chaotic hours after landing, these combat policemen took over control of the huge volume of traffic debarking from the invasion fleet.  In the thick of battle, they established direction points and performed beach security patrol.  On June 10, 1944, Company D, 783rd Military Police Battalion, landed on the beaches of Normandy to relieve the 101st, 82nd, and 4th Divisions’ Military Policemen.  Their primary concern was to create order out of the hectic traffic flow in order to allow the forces to move form the beachheads to their assigned areas.  Later, during the Battle of the Bulge, the 783rd MP’s were called upon again to shed their traditional role and become front line riflemen while maintaining vital road blocks and bridges.

Following the beach landings at Normandy and the breakout at St. Lo, the 783rd Military Police Battalion was assigned a more traditional, but vitally significant role in supporting the Allied forces.  As the Allies advanced through France, the lack of needed supplies, which lay in depots near the Normandy beaches, greatly hindered the forward movement of the combat divisions.  The initial plan for the advance had called for utilizing the excellent French railways to move the supplies forward, but it had been ruined by the destruction of the French rail system.  A solution to this problem was the creation of the Red Ball Highway, consisting of two parallel routes, each running one way, through Normandy, France, and Belgium.  This network represented one of the greatest supply enterprises in military annals.  Implementing the Military Police phase of the Red ball Highway, the 783rd Military Police Battalion began patrolling operational areas along the route, which constantly changed as the advance continued.  Working at times under enemy ground and air attack, this battalion patrolled the Red Ball Highway day and night without blackout precautions.  Making round trips of up to three hundred miles, supply trucks delivered 412,193 tons of supplies along the route during the eighty-one days the Red Ball Highway operated.

No incident exemplifies the courage, tenacity, and determination of combat military police better than the security and movement of allied troops across the Ludendorf Bridge at Reagan, Germany.  Left standing by the hastily retreating German Army, the bridge was given great priority for capture and protection by Supreme Allied Headquarters.  Major General Louis Craig, 9th Infantry Division Commander, ordered his Provost Marshal, Major Clair Hull Thurston, to move his military police ahead of the division to reconnoiter the best route and provide security to the bridge until the division arrived.  On the morning of 6 March, the 47th Infantry began a crossing operation which attracted a barrage of enemy artillery and sniper fire that which lasted for ten days.  The bridge traffic was limited to foot traffic for the first two days; but by 9 March 1945, trucks and tanks began to cross the span.  Military police were stationed at intervals along both sides of the bridge, and other MP’s manned sniper positions on the river banks to prevent German frogmen from blowing up the bridge.  From 9 March to 17 March, the military police stood at their posts on the bridge.  Unable to take cover, they maintained a steady flow of supplies, evacuees, and troop movement across it.  Since numerous vehicles were hit, the military police had to clear the wreckage and to serve as replacements for injured and or frightened drivers.  Aid stations and prisoner of war cages at both ends of the bridge were also manned by military police temporarily rotated from their bridge positions.  In addition, wire communications cross the bridge were installed and maintained by the military police.  After five days the military police company, the 9th Military Police Company was augmented by seventy-five infantrymen.  By March 17, three divisions had crossed the bridge at Remagen and the 9th Military Police Company was ordered to return to its division which was rapidly advancing into Germany.  The bridge collapsed just minutes after this company had left its positions. The military police had displayed magnificent courage, control, and discipline throughout the ordeal.  They showed little concern for their own personal safety in the face of almost certain death.  Instead, they managed to speed traffic across the bridge, limiting casualties and aiding in the rapid advance of Allied troops.  Their efforts were honored by the receipt of a Presidential Unit Citation for Gallantry in Action.

While the 9th Military Police Company was highly commemorated and decorated, there were other divisional military police companies which performed equally well under combat conditions.  Landing on Omaha Beach during the D-Day attacks, the 1st Division Military Police Company cleared the beaches, processed almost 785 prisoners of war and established six island traffic control points, despite the loss of its vehicles when its supply ship sank offshore.  By the end of D-Day, four members of the 1st Military Police Platoon had earned the Silver Star: Captain R.R. Regan, Lieutenant F.J. Zaniewski, Lieutenant Charles M. Conover, and Lieutenant William L. Bradford.  Casualties sustained by the platoon totaled one killed in action and twenty-two wounded.  In the rapidly advancing 4th Division, the military police had problems processing prisoners of war.  At one time, there were as many as five processing points with from 300 to 2,000 prisoners at each.  The total captured in a week amounted to about 11,200 prisoners, producing a ratio of one guard for every 300 prisoners of war.  Eleven military police from this company received the Purple Heart because of their front line combat duty.  The necessity for rapid advance by military police squads to establish prisoner of war processing points sent this company into continuous frontline action.

While the world celebrated the conclusion of World War II in 1945, the military police were engaged in disposing of the evil residue of that conflict.  For the first time in the annals of military history, the perpetrators of war crimes were made to answer for their deeds before specially constituted war crimes tribunals and courts.  Throughout those proceedings, the military police guarded the accused, provided courtroom security during their trials, and supervised the fulfillment of their sentences; wither execution or imprisonment, of those convicted.

The process for dealing with accrued war criminals commenced in Europe shortly after the fighting had ended there.  A number of top German military and Nazi party leaders initially were gathered together at Mondorf-les-Bains in Luxembourg. There, they were housed in the Palace Hotel. Stripped of its peacetime finery and equipped with bars on its room windows.  Colonel Burton C. Andrus, a career cavalry officer who had previously served as a prison officer for an Army Stockade at Fort Oglethorpe, was their warden.  In August 1945, he transferred his charges, including Herman Goering, Hitler’s chief deputy, to Nuremberg, Germany, the location selected by the Allied Powers for the accused war criminals’ trial before an international tribunal composed of jurists from the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union.

Nuremberg was an ironic choice for the trial.  Formerly it had served as the site for Nazi party congresses and rallies.  It also had been the namesake for the infamous Nuremberg Laws which the party had issued in 1935 stripping German Jews of their citizenship, prohibiting them from participating in such professions as law and medicine, and starting Germany down the road to the horrors of the holocaust.  The Allies chose Nuremberg for the trial because its Palace of Justice with its adjoining jail was the most compact and intact facility available within Germany for such a proceeding.

The military police who served at Nuremberg came from the First Infantry Division.  Initially, Colonel Andrus had to make do with one under strength company.  By the time that the trial commenced in November 1945, another company had been added to the guard force. Finally, in April 1946, the 793rd MP Battalion arrived in Nuremberg and absorbed the two resident companies, the 802nd and 821st MP Companies into its ranks.

The trial of twenty-one leading German war criminals lasted until September 1946.  During it, the MP’s escorted the accused to and from the courtroom and provided security within the courtroom itself.  During the daily proceedings, ten MP’s in white helmets, white belts, and equipped with white billy clubs fashioned from mop handles remained positioned behind and to the side of the dock. Colonel Andrus and the officer in charge of the military police detail carried side arms.

The military police kept the prisoners under constant surveillance when they were not in court.  Colonel Andrus instituted around-the-clock watches on them after one of the accused had hanged himself in his cell prior to the start of the trial.  In three-hour shifts, the MP’s observed the prisoners through small window ports in their cell doors.

The international tribunal found eighteen of the twenty-one defendants guilty and acquitted the remaining three.  It sentenced eleven of the convicted men to death, and allotted prison terms ranging in length from ten years to life to the other seven.  In the early morning hours of October 16, 1946, the military police escorted ten of the condemned men one-by-one from their cells to the prison gymnasium where they were hanged from hastily erected gallows.  The eleventh condemned man, Herman Goering, cheated the hangman that night by swallowing cyanide poison from a glass vial which he had managed to keep with him despite numerous searches of his person and cell.  Following the executions, military police from the 508th Military Police Battalion and the Constabulary moved the bodies in two trucks to the Dachau concentration camp where they were cremated in the same ovens formerly employed to dispose of the remains of those men’s victims.  The MP’s then scattered their ashes in a brook near Munich, the birthplace of the Nazi movement.

Security around the Palace of Justice was extra tight that night due to concern that diehard Nazis might attempt to storm the prison in order to rescue their former leaders.  The recent rifling of two American arms rooms gave credence to such a possibility.  Thus, as a precaution, armed patrols cordoned off a nine square block area surrounding the Palace of Justice, and MP’ armed with Thompson submachine guns manned a fence in front of the building.  Fortunately, the executions progressed without any attack materializing.

The seven remaining convicted criminals were transferred to Spandau Prison in Berlin to serve out their sentences under Allied supervision.  The Allies equally have shared the responsibility for guarding them by rotating control of the prison in Berlin to serve out their sentences under Allied supervision.  The Allies equally have shared the responsibility fro guarding them by rotating control of the prison on a monthly cycle.  Today, only one man, Rudolf Hess, remains behind the prison walls, and every four months a contingent of American military police assumes the task of guarding him.

Meanwhile, on the other side of the globe similar proceedings against war criminals in the Pacific Theatre were underway.  With the occupation of Japan, Headquarters Far East Command and the Eighth Army faced the task of providing adequate facilities for the confinement of hundreds of war criminal suspects. As the Provost Marshal of the Eighth Army, Colonel Carol V. Cadwell assumed the responsibility for solving this problem.  Initially, Omori and Yokohama Prisons, which had been used by the Japanese to confine Allied prisoners-or-war, were used to house war criminal suspects.  Since neither facility was considered adequate for the task ahead, Colonel Cadwell acquired control of Sugamo Prison as a replacement facility.  Having suffered only minor bomb damage during the war, Sugamo was a modern brick penal institution capable of housing 1,800 prisoners.

During the trials in Japan, a select group of military police from the 720th Military Police Battalion provided security for an International Military Tribunal consisting of leading judges from ten nations.  Under the command of Lt. Col. Aubrey S. Kenworthy, the military police detachment also was responsible for transporting war criminals to and from Sugamo for the duration of the trials.  From October 1946 until April 1948, they continued to extend their tours in order to complete the assignment.  After the trials were completed, approximately fifty members of the 720th MP Battalion were detailed to Sugamo to provide security until the Tribunal sentences could be executed.  The prison personnel at Sugamo consisted of those condemned, those sentenced to long term imprisonment, and those undergoing trial.  Of the 1,700 Japanese war criminals confined by the US Army, four were women, one of whom was the famed “Tokyo Rose”.  She was confined until her release late 1946.

Victory and the resulting demobilization brought a decline in the number of persons and units assigned to the Military Police Corps.  However, its responsibilities continued to expand wherever United States military forces were stationed.  Combat commanders around the world recognized the contributions made by military police.  As a result, for the first time in our nation’s history, the Military Police Corps became a component in the Army’s peacetime force structure.  In many instances, military police were the first forces to move into occupied areas, where they fostered trust and respect for United States forces.  They combated the problems of lawlessness, plundering, and black marketing while assuming the role of local government which had been prostrated by years of fighting.  Although the Military Police Corps had been reduced to 2,078 officers and 19, 630 enlisted men by 1947, many of these soldiers were destined to serve in a new kind of conflict – a “police action.”

Korean War

On 25 June 1950 the North Koreans, in an effort to unify the Korean peninsula under communism, struck south of the 38th parallel.  This action was followed by the immediate intervention of United Nations troops to defend South Korea.  Since American troops were stationed in Japan, even though they were occupation troops and not trained combat units, they were the first to see actual service in Korea.  Following the outbreak of hostilities, the first military police company to arrive in Korea was the 622nd Military Police Company, landing on 5 July 1950.  During the conflict, this company received ten battle participation credits as well as a Meritorious Unit Citation and a Korean Presidential Unit Citation for service.  In the demilitarized zone, the principal duty of this company was to prevent unauthorized persons from entering the area.  Men from the company also supervised the Korean Security Guard Company, which patrolled thirty-five miles of gasoline pipeline passing through the I Corps Area.

To Be Continued

Text for this page of the web site taken from “Military Police Corps Regimental History, ST 19-154, US Army Military Police School, Fort McClellan, Alabama

For further historical information on the Military Police Corps go to the following site(s)

http://www.wood.army.mil/usamps/history/default.htm

 

 

 


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